I. INTRODUCTION
Over forty-nine million elderly and disabled Americans currently receive health care coverage through Medicare. It is a massive government program that accounted for 14% of the federal budget in 2013. 1 In the event that Medicare refuses to cover an enrollee's request for a specific medical treatment, item, or prescription drug, that individual may appeal the decision through a multi-tiered appeals process. The third stage of a Medicare appeal involves a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). These ALJs are employed by the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA), an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
ALJs have a critical responsibility to take evidence at hearings, serve as a trier of facts, and, ultimately, render a decision on the merits of the appeal.
In November 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of HHS issued a report entitled Improvements Are Needed at the Administrative Law Judge Level of Medicare Appeals. 2 The OIG Report provides an interesting statistical analysis of ALJ cases, along with ten recommendations from the OIG intended to improve the accuracy, efficiency, and reliability of ALJ decisions. But more importantly, it reveals serious deficiencies by ALJs, and their staff, that need to be addressed and remediated above and beyond the OIG recommendations.
Part II of this article will provide a brief overview of Medicare and its appeals process, with an emphasis on the third level of appeals before ALJs. Part III will examine the findings and recommendations from the OIG. And Part IV will provide an in-depth analysis of the major deficiencies and failures of Medicare's ALJs. some exceptions. 10 And Part D provides coverage for prescription drugs, biologicals, and vaccines. 11 Part D is offered through prescription drug plans (PDPs) and MA plans with drug coverage.
Medicare's appeal process is designed to reverse erroneous claim denials and correct mistakes. 12 It can only begin after an "initial determination" is made that denies coverage, in whole or in part, for a Medicare enrollee. 13 The enrollee, an appointed representative, or assignee (i.e., the practitioner or medical supplier who provided the service or item) can then appeal this decision. The appeals process includes five levels, and the appellant must exhaust each level before proceeding to the next level. The five levels are:
Level 1: For Parts A and B, a Medicare contractor will make a "redetermination." 14 Here the same Medicare contractor who made the initial determination will take a second look at the claim, although a different individual will review it. For Parts C and D, the MA plan or the PDP will also review and take a second look at the claim. 15 There is no minimum amount in controversy for a Level 1 appeal.
Act created Part C in 1997 to encourage wider availability of managed care options in Medicare through health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and the participation of other types of coordinated care plans.
See Balanced Budget Act of 1997 , Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251 (1997 .
Level 2: For Parts A and B, a "reconsideration" 16 will be conducted by a "Qualified Independent Contractor" (QIC), a third-party reviewer that is under contract with CMS. 17 For Parts C and D, a review will be conducted by an "Independent Review Entity" (IRE), also a thirdparty reviewer contracted by CMS. 18 Level 2 appeals are conducted after a review of evidence in the case file. 19 There is no minimum amount in controversy for a Level 2 appeal. during the hearing, 40 any "new evidence" that was not submitted during Level 2 "must be accompanied by a statement explaining why the evidence was not previously submitted." 41 The ALJ will then consider whether "good cause" exists for submitting the evidence for the first time at the ALJ level. 42 If the ALJ does not find "good cause," then the evidence must be excluded from the hearing and the ALJ may not consider it when making his or her determination. 43 If "good cause" exists, then the ALJ may consider the evidence. 44 During a hearing the ALJ may question the parties and other witnesses. 45 The parties are also allowed to question witnesses. 46 Any party to the hearing has the right to "present evidence and to state his or her position." 47 Parties may also present written statements to the ALJ about the facts and the law material to the case. 48 These documents must be provided to the other parties at the same time they are filed with the ALJ. 49 It is relevant to note that the scope of the OIG's review was less than comprehensive. The OIG failed to interview any administrators of prescription drug plans (PDPs) and Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. It also neglected to interview anyone from Maximus, the IRE that is heavily involved in Level 2 Part C and Part D appeals. Furthermore, the OIG did not consult any providers who are regularly involved in the appeals process. 52 The OIG also failed to interview any State Medicaid agencies that may appeal when questions arise as to whom should pay "for services or items received by individuals covered by both Medicare and Medicaid. 53 As a result, the OIG has delivered a report that includes a good analysis of Medicare's ALJs, but is nonetheless incomplete.
51 "The Managing Administrative Law Judge (MALJ) is responsible for the administration of the field office, and is charged with ensuring the just, timely, accurate, and professional adjudication of all Medicare claims appeals." 74 Fed. Reg. 65,296, 65,323 (December 9, 2009 ).
52 Here "provider" refers generally to those who provide medical treatment or medical supplies to Medicare enrollees. It therefore includes physicians, clinics, hospitals, provider groups, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs), and medical suppliers, such as those who provide durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS).
53 Individuals with coverage under both Medicare and Medicaid are known as "dual eligibles." For its report, the OIG analyzed a total of 40,682 appeals that ALJs adjudicated in fiscal year 2010. 54 One would naturally expect that the majority of appeals would be filed by Medicare members themselves. Yet the OIG found that 85% of all appeals were filed by providers. 55 This is likely explained by the significant financial interest providers have in the outcome of appeals, particularly for Medicare patients in need of treatment in acute and post-acute settings. The average provider filed six appeals. 56 Only 11% of the appeals were filed by actual Medicare members. 57 Some providers filed appeals so frequently that the OIG created a special category to identify them. The OIG designated providers who filed at least fifty appeals in a fiscal year as "frequent filers." 58 Incredibly, ninety-six providers fell into this category, 59 and one provider managed to file 1046 appeals in 2010 alone. 60 Furthermore, frequent filers actually filed an even greater number of appeals since at least some of their appeals were approved at Levels 1 or 2 and never reached an ALJ.
The high percentage of appeals filed by providers points to a significant problem with the Medicare appeals process. Providers with claims lacking true merit have little inducement to accept Level 2 denials by QICs or IREs. ALJ staff indicated that providers are incented to appeal "every payment denial" since the actual cost of an appeal is minimal, and there is a statistical likelihood of a favorable 54 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 55 decision. 61 Due to the sheer number of frequent filers, the decision to appeal every treatment denial is likely built into the business model as well as the policies and procedures of many providers. This fact is troubling since appellants with meritless claims or those that lack medical necessity are motivated to appeal denials and game the system until a favorable decision is reached. In essence, the more often these providers dip their buckets into the well of Medicare appeals, the greater the likelihood they will come up with Medicare dollars. In order to curb this abuse of the appeals process by frequent filers and other providers, the OIG recommended that OMHA seek statutory authority to implement a "modest filing fee" for appellants. 62 To make the fee fair and effective, the OIG suggested that OMHA create a scaled fee that is based on the dollar amount at issue in the appeal. 63 The OIG also noted that the filing fee should not apply to beneficiaries because providers have greater financial resources than the average Medicare enrollee. These are excellent proposals by the OIG that should, if implemented, counteract the abuse of the appeals process by some providers.
CMS Participation in Appeals
The OIG found that CMS participated in 10% of Level 3 appeals in 2010. 64 CMS has the option to participate in ALJ appeals, and may do so as either a participant or a party. However, CMS rarely chose to participate as a party, which would allow it to submit evidence, call or cross-examine witnesses, and appeal to the MAC. 65 When CMS chose to participate, it provided testimony in 61% of appeals and submitted position papers to the ALJs in the remaining 61 Id. at 9. 62 39%. 66 Appellants were 16% less likely to prevail when CMS was involved in an appeal. 67 ALJ staff cited several benefits from CMS participation in appeals. The primary benefit appears to be an improved relationship between both agencies. ALJ staff also indicated that CMS often provided them with "needed information" 68 and helped them understand the importance of including specific detail in decisions and position papers to ALJs. 69 CMS intends to join more appeals as a party, rather than as a participant, to allow CMS to better present its position on certain issues being appealed. 70 Due to the apparent benefits of collaboration, the OIG recommended that CMS expand its participation in ALJ appeals. 71 The OIG also instructed CMS to strategically decide which types of appeals most warrant CMS participation, such as Part A hospital appeals or appeals from frequent filers. 72 Finally, CMS was urged to create formal participation guidelines, including the specific scenarios to determine whether to participate in an appeal as a party or as a participant. 73 The author concurs with these OIG recommendations. More frequent involvement in appeals by CMS will improve the reliability and accuracy of ALJ decisions. And as I will discuss in section IV.A., infra, it will assist ALJs who frequently have difficulty interpreting and applying complex Medicare guidelines and regulations.
Accepting New Evidence
Medicare regulations are clear that ALJs may only consider new evidence that was not proffered during Level 2 66 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. 67 Id. if "good cause" exists for submitting the evidence. 74 Absent good cause, the evidence must be excluded and the ALJ cannot consider it. 75 Despite these unambiguous standards, the OIG found that ALJs typically accepted new evidence whenever it was submitted. The author has also found many ALJs to be suspect in their application of the good cause standard. Often, over repeated objections, ALJs admit new evidence by claiming that the objecting party was not "harmed" by the evidence. To address this issue, the OIG charged OMHA and CMS to revise the regulations to "include additional examples as well as factors for ALJs to consider when determining good cause." 76 Following the OIG Report, CMS revised its claims processing manual in June 2013 to include conditions and examples of good cause for enrollees, providers, and suppliers. 77 Although this guidance is not in the binding form of regulations, it provides much needed direction to ALJs and parties to an appeal.
Additional OIG Recommendations
The OIG issued additional recommendations at the conclusion of its report. First, the OIG urged OMHA and CMS to work together to provide "coordinated training" on an annual basis to ALJs and QICs on Medicare policies. 78 Through this measure, the OIG hopes to increase the consistency between Level 2 and Level 3 appeals. 79 One area of focus that the OIG identified was Part A hospital appeals where ALJs reversed QICs in nearly three-quarters of appeals. 80 Second, OMHA and CMS should seek statutory authority to postpone appeals from appellants who are concurrently being investigated for fraud. 81 The decision to 74 
IV. MAJOR DEFICIENCIES WITH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES
In the course of conducting this study, the OIG was able to unearth several issues with Medicare ALJs and Level 3 appeals that need to be corrected. These problems, as discussed in section III, have relatively easy solutions. They also do not indicate any systemic issues with ALJs or OMHA. But the OIG did manage to identify other ALJ deficiencies that can be classified as "major" problem areas. The OIG failed, however, to explore these deficiencies in depth. Section IV will address these issues.
A. Knowledge, Expertise, and Competency of ALJs
The OIG found that ALJs reversed Level 2 decisions by Quality Independent Contractors (QICs), and decided fully in favor of appellants, in 56% of appeals. 84 And an additional 6% of ALJ decisions were partially favorable to appellants. 85 This overturn rate of a lower adjudicatory body is extremely high. In an analysis of data from civil cases in federal court from 1988-97, for example, only 18% of cases were reversed on appeal. 86 raises numerous questions. The OIG found several reasons for this high overturn rate, and they reflect directly on the knowledge, expertise, and competency of the ALJs hired, trained, and retained by OMHA.
Decisions Based on "Intent" Rather Than Applicable Law
Both QIC and ALJ staff indicated to the OIG that ALJs tended to interpret Medicare policies "less strictly" than QICs. 88 ALJ staff also acknowledged that ALJs often decided in favor of appellants when the "intent," but not the letter, of Medicare policy was met. 89 QICs, on the other hand, based their decisions on strict interpretations of Medicare guidance. For instance, the OIG found cases where QICs denied payment because enrollees met only 9 out of 10 criteria in a local coverage determination (LCD). 90 Clearly CMS' criteria were not met. Yet on appeal ALJs reversed the QICs and approved coverage since the ALJs felt that the appellants "met the broader intent of the policy." 91 One must wonder how these ALJs divined the "broader intent" of Medicare policy when CMS' standard is to only cover treatments that meet the established criteria.
In another example, Medicare covers home health services under Part A when several specific requirements are met. One criterion is that the member must be "homebound" (i.e., confined to his or her home). 92 The OIG identified appeals where QICs denied home health services for enrollees because they failed to meet the homebound requirement. 93 Yet ALJs reversed the QIC determinations 88 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 10-11. 89 Id. at 11. 90 Id. 91 Id. 92 To qualify for home health services, a member must (1) be homebound; (2) need intermittent skilled nursing care, physical or speech therapy, or continuing occupational therapy; (3) be under the care of a physician; and (4) be under a plan of care that has been Most ALJs understand this and adjudicate appeals accordingly. Nonetheless some ALJs have utilized a clever way to sidestep Medicare's mandatory authority when they disagree with it. They accomplish this by manipulating the fact that although Medicare laws and regulations are binding, CMS manuals are not. Instead, ALJs must afford "substantial deference" to the manuals when they are applicable. 95 When drafting a decision that contravenes binding Medicare authority, these ALJs will conveniently only cite the applicable CMS manual. Any skilled ALJ can easily explain why the particular facts of an appealed case are unique and fall outside of the manual's criteria. With such judicial machinations, the treatment can be covered pursuant to the ALJ's own coverage standards. 94 The author is aware of such a scenario from a Level 3 appeal involving Part C. The appeal pertained to an enrollee's stay in a skilled nursing facility (SNF), and both the Medicare Advantage (MA) plan and Maximus-the independent review entity (IRE)-had previously denied the enrollee's appeal because the stay failed to meet Medicare's four criteria for SNF coverage. These criteria are stated in Medicare regulations and are therefore binding on ALJs. 96 But the criteria are also repeated in the CMS Medicare Benefit Policy Manual. 97 For whatever reason, the ALJ wanted the MA plan to cover the SNF stay. In a lengthy written decision that reversed the IRE, the ALJ only referenced the CMS manual and determined that the SNF should be covered since the ALJ considered the stay to be medically necessary.
Difficulty Understanding Medicare Law
Incredibly, many ALJs have demonstrated difficulty understanding Medicare law and then applying the law to the specific facts of appealed cases. For instance, the OIG found that some ALJs struggled interpreting the "vague definitions" contained in some Medicare policies. 98 Other ALJs indicated that they found it difficult alternating between appeals involving Parts A, B, or D of Medicare. 99 And many ALJ staff members blamed the variance in ALJ decisions on the fact that Medicare policies were not written "more narrowly or more clearly." 100 These Granted, there are ambiguities in Medicare laws and regulations, and some CMS policies lack clarity. Due to these issues, the OIG recommended that OMHA and CMS coordinate on at least an annual basis to identify policies that are unclear. 107 CMS can then work, as needed, to develop and clarify these policies.
As a final note, although OMHA provides ALJs with support personnel, their staff does not include medical directors or clinicians. Level 2 QICs and IREs, on the other hand, have access to such medical experts. The lack of clinicians on staff certainly adds to the difficulty some ALJs may experience adjudicating appeals, particularly when the medical necessity of treatments, drugs, or supplies is at issue. 108 It also explains why the OIG found that ALJs tend to place an over emphasis on "testimony and other evidence from treating physicians." 109
Judicial Bias
The most egregious issue surrounding ALJ performance involves judicial bias. The OIG found that many ALJs appear to have a pre-disposition to approve or deny appeals regardless of the merits of a claim. For instance, one ALJ stated to the OIG: "Some [ALJs] pay, some deny." 110 Another claimed, "I go towards protecting the Medicare Trust Fund [s] ." 111 The right to an impartial adjudication is a fundamental aspect of due process, and this right applies as equally in an 107 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 17. 108 Medicare specifically excludes coverage for services that are not "reasonable and necessary . . . [f] or the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body member." 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(k)(1) (2014). This is generally known as Medicare's "medical necessity" standard. 109 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. 110 Id. administrative proceeding as it does in a court of law. 112 As relevant background, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 created the position of administrative law judge within the federal government. 113 The APA was passed to ensure fairness and due process in proceedings that involve adjudications by ALJs. 114 The APA requires that ALJs act "in an impartial manner" when presiding at hearings. 115 Medicare regulations are also clear on this point: "An ALJ cannot conduct a hearing if he or she is prejudiced or partial to any party or has any interest in the matter pending for decision." 116 The Supreme Court held that bias exists when a judge demonstrates "such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make a fair judgment impossible." 117 The OIG Report indicates that some ALJs have met this threshold. Because judicial bias impacts the integrity of the Medicare appeals process and prevents parties from receiving a full and fair review of their claims, OMHA must consider disciplinary action against ALJs who exhibited bias. The disciplinary action should include removal from OMHA's panel of ALJs for those who have demonstrated "systematic bias" against certain parties. 118 112 See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) . 113 Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 , Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946 [hereinafter APA]. When the APA was enacted, ALJs were called "hearing examiners." Congress changed the title to "administrative law judges" in 1978 when the APA was amended. See Act of Mar. 27 1978 , Pub. L. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978 (amending 5 U.S.C. § § 554(a) (2) 556(b)(3) 559, 1305, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5362, 7251 (2014) 
Deficient Training
One reason for the dubious performance and knowledge gaps demonstrated by ALJs is deficient training. As a result of its study, the OIG felt compelled to recommend that OMHA and CMS "work together to develop and provide training on Medicare policies to ALJ and QIC staff." 120 Both agencies were charged to "provide training at least annually and focus on policies that tend to be interpreted differently by ALJs and QICs or among ALJs." 121 OMHA's formal, written response to the OIG recommendation is puzzling. Rather than agree with the OIG, Judge Nancy J. Griswold, the current Chief Administrative Law Judge for OMHA, countered that OMHA already conducts an annual education symposium for all ALJs, in addition to "high-quality training" on Medicare law and policy for new ALJs and attorneys. 122 In terms of modifying or supplementing OMHA's current ALJ training protocol, Judge Griswold noted that OMHA is in deciding cases. Rather, an administrative law judge is required to reach decisions by impartially applying the legal rules to the facts established in each case.") 119 An in-depth discussion of the disciplinary process of the MSPB is beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, the APA allows a federal agency to take disciplinary action against an ALJ for "good cause," which must be established and determined by the MSPB. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2014). Evidence of judicial bias would certainly meet the good cause standard. In cases where bias was evident, disciplinary action against an ALJ can include removal, suspension, reduction in grade, developing a "comprehensive legal assistant training program," and that "quarterly policy updates" will be provided to ALJs and staff. 123 Based on Judge Griswold's response, the only modification to OMHA's current training protocol for ALJs is that they will receive quarterly policy updates. Given the OIG's findings of ALJ knowledge gaps and deficiencies, this is surprising. Moreover, the Chief ALJ was already on notice about deficient ALJ training at least two years earlier.
In a 2010 report, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyzed the hiring process for federal ALJs. 124 In the GAO Report, OMHA noted that many of its newly hired ALJs lacked the "specialized knowledge important for adjudicating cases in HHS." 125 In the meantime, OMHA's Chief ALJ has been blissfully ignorant of the training gaps at OMHA. In a 2012 fiscal year report to HHS, for example, Judge Griswold boasted of the "cadre of knowledgeable ALJs" on staff. 126 Unfortunately, all the deficiencies that the OIG identified (i.e., erroneous decisions, difficulty understanding Medicare law, and judicial bias) will likely continue until OMHA recognizes that ALJ training and education must be significantly upgraded. 123 Id. 125 Id. at 10. 126 OMHA REPORT, supra note 102, at 1. CMS also apparently believes that the status quo is acceptable for ALJ training. In a 2009 HHS final rule, CMS asserted that ALJs receive "significant and comprehensive training" about Medicare statutes and regulations after they are hired. 74 Fed. Reg. 65,296, 65,315-316 (Dec. 9, 2009) . Through this extensive training, CMS asserts that ALJs are armed with the "knowledge and expertise necessary to address the highly complex and technical issues associated with Medicare claims appeals." Id. at 65,136.
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B. Handling Fraud
In the course of processing and adjudicating appeals, ALJs and their staff often come across evidence indicating a party may have committed fraud against the government. In fact, nearly all ALJ staff reported to the OIG that they suspected fraudulent activity by parties involved in appeals. 127 Despite these suspicions, many staff members acknowledged that during their tenure with OMHA they had never made a single fraud referral. 128 Others claimed to have made at least one referral.
Overall, a culture of silence appears to predominate OMHA offices when employees are faced with the opportunity to report fraud. Some staff candidly admitted to the OIG that they declined to make fraud referrals because they did not consider it a part of their job duties. 129 Two quotes from different ALJ staff members are telling: (1) "[I] never referred and do not want to refer anything . . . [it is] not our business here"; and (2) " [T] here is an unspoken rule not to report fraud." 130 Due to this spotty record of fraud reporting, the OIG recommended that OMHA "develop policies to handle suspicions of fraud appropriately and consistently and train staff accordingly." 131 Judge Griswold, OMHA's Chief ALJ, issued a formal response to the OIG Report and its fraud recommendation. Judge Griswold countered that:
OMHA has conducted anti-fraud training sessions in conjunction with the OIG and CMS. OMHA staff has been informed how to report suspicions of fraud regarding an appeal. OMHA continues to develop policies aimed at providing guidance to ALJs and their staff 127 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. 128 133 Third, there is no mention if OMHA maintains a verification or certification process to ensure that all employees and ALJs attend the training. Fourth, Judge Griswold claims that her entire department has made "several" fraud referrals, with no mention of quantity or timeframe. 134 Because OMHA provided no actual figures on how many suspected cases of fraud were reported, one can reasonably assume the number is quite low. Finally, Judge Griswold states that ALJ staff received anti-fraud training and was informed "how" to report fraud. But as the OIG indicated, the problem is not that OMHA employees do not know where or how to report fraud; the problem is that some staff feel they have no affirmative duty whatsoever to identify and report fraud.
OMHA's apathetic handling of suspected cases of fraud is clearly lacking. Hence the directive from the OIG that OMHA " [d] evelop policies to handle suspicions of fraud appropriately and consistently and train staff For example, there is no indication whether the training is required only at the time of hiring (i.e., "one-and-done" training), or if it is an annual, recurring requirement for all employees.
134 Judge Griswold's claim here leads to numerous, legitimate questions of the time period involved when the fraud referrals occurred. For instance, did OMHA make "several" (i.e., more than two) fraud referrals during the same week that Judge Griswold wrote her letter? Or has OMHA made "several" (i.e., more than two) referrals over the past five years?
90
INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW Vol. 12:1 accordingly." 135 Furthermore, OMHA's shortcomings are significant when one considers (1) the fraud policy of the Obama administration; (2) whether the failure to report fraud is grounds for termination of employment; and (3) the fraud-reporting obligations that CMS imposes on private entities involved in Medicare. This section will address each of these areas.
Obama Administration
The checkered fraud-reporting record of ALJs and their staff runs counter to the express policy of the Obama administration. This policy is evidenced through official statements, an Executive Order, and legislation. Prior to President Barack Obama's first inauguration in 2009, for example, the Obama-Biden transition team emphasized the importance of ethics in the federal government.
The transition team stated:
Often the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in government is an existing government employee committed to public integrity and willing to speak out. Such acts of courage and patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer dollars, should be encouraged rather than stifled. We need to empower federal employees as watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners in performance. Barack Obama will strengthen whistleblower laws to protect federal workers who expose waste, fraud, and abuse of authority in government. 136 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under President Obama has also echoed the refrain that federal employees have an obligation to help root out corruption in government and protect taxpayer dollars.
In No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,673 (January 26, 2009 ALJs have not only violated these principles, but many appear to act with a deliberate disregard of their duty to disclose fraud when they become aware or suspicious of it.
A violation of any one of the Ethical Standards is prima facie evidence that an individual has "engaged in conduct unbecoming a federal employee." 151 Since 1998, federal employees across several government agencies, including HHS, have been fired or suspended for violating these standards. 152 HHS regulations, incidentally, also require HHS employees to immediately report any cases of fraud, waste, or abuse that they become aware of. 153 Based solely on the OIG interviews of ALJ staff, it is impossible to quantify the percentage of ALJs and staff who suspected fraudulent activity but violated the Ethical Standards by not reporting it. But in a government agency with approximately 514 employees 154 and that processed 79,303 appeals in 2013, 155 it is certainly reasonable to assume that minimally dozens of OMHA employees were exposed to fraudulent activity by parties involved in appeals. Yet despite a legal and ethical obligation to report Medicare fraud, it is not occurring. The lax commitment by ALJs toward identifying and reporting fraud against the government stands in vivid (as well as ironic) contrast to the standards CMS imposes on private companies involved in Medicare's Part C (Medicare Advantage) and Part D (prescription drug) programs. Both CMS and OMHA are affiliate government agencies that report directly to HHS. CMS is responsible for oversight of entities offering Medicare Advantage and prescription drug plans. In this capacity, CMS currently requires every "sponsor" of these plans to implement a Medicare "compliance program." 156 In order to pass CMS muster, a compliance program must minimally include the following components that are related to fraud:
• Sponsors must report "actual or suspected 157 MMCM, supra note 157, at § 50.3.1; PDBM, supra note 157, at § 50.3.1. CMS also mandates that fraud training includes instruction on identifying and reporting "waste" and "abuse." CMS describes "waste" as "the overutilization of services, or other practices that, directly or indirectly, result in unnecessary costs to the Medicare program. Waste is generally not considered to be caused by criminally negligent actions but rather the misuse of resources." MMCM, § 20; PDBM, § 20. "Abuse" is described as "actions that may, directly or indirectly, result in: unnecessary costs to the Medicare Program, improper payment, payment for services that fail to meet professionally recognized standards of care, or services that are medically unnecessary. Abuse involves payment for items or services when there is no legal entitlement to that payment and the provider has not knowingly and/or intentionally misrepresented the facts to obtain payment." Id. issue that requires remediation when it failed to analyze the appeal records that ALJs forward to the MAC.
V. CONCLUSION
The OIG was successful in identifying numerous deficiencies with Medicare's ALJs and the third level of Medicare appeals. But the OIG Report failed to adequately address the magnitude of the deficiencies and the appropriate remedial action necessary to correct them. The core problem involves the competency and performance of the ALJs themselves. OMHA's panel of ALJs includes judges who are simply not fit to hold hearings and adjudicate appeals. If ALJs exhibit bias, disregard binding authority, or have (with any modicum of experience) difficulty understanding Medicare laws and regulations, then those individuals should simply not serve as triers of fact and decision-makers.
Part of the problem lies at the feet of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM should not send ALJ candidates to OHMA who have little, if any, prior experience with Medicare. But OMHA merits a greater amount of culpability for providing substandard training and follow-up for the ALJs who are already on staff, and OMHA must accept responsibility for keeping ALJs on panel who have demonstrated bias against specific types of individuals or parties. OMHA must attempt to identify these ALJs, and then initiate the appropriate process with the Merit Systems Protection Board to discipline or remove them. 179 Medicare enrollees, plan sponsors, providers and suppliers deserve nothing less than fair and impartial adjudications.
OMHA must also develop better fraud training and require ALJs and staff to attend training at the time of hire and at least annually thereafter. Many ALJs simply do not understand nor accept their fraud-reporting obligations. As employees of HHS, they must recognize that they are stewards of the Medicare Trust Funds, and they must be
